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Abstract 
Human operators are required to respond to alarms in normal conditions, and also to find solutions to unexpected situations in real time. 
The aim of this study is to increase the knowledge of human responses to alarms in the context of occupational situations. It describes how 
humans contribute to accidents, and pays special attention to the assurance of process safety assurance, which is in part realized by timely 
reactions to system alarms. An experiment involving an operator´s reaction times to alarm signals was undertaken to investigate whether 
there are differential responses to visual as opposed to auditory alarms. The findings in the research show that visual alarm indicators are 
perceived faster than auditory signals. Furthermore, there was a significant negative correlation between the number of errors and reaction 
time, indicating an individual difference in error-proneness when reacting to visual alarms in a supervisory task.  
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Error humano y reacción a alarmas en seguridad de procesos 
 
Resumen 
Operadores humanos responden a alarmas en condiciones normales y también en situaciones inesperadas y anormales en tiempo real. El 
objetivo de este estudio consiste en aumentar el conocimiento de las reacciones humanas a alarmas en el ámbito laboral. Describe como  
los humanos pueden contribuir a accidentes y presta atención a la seguridad del proceso que se efectúa en el tiempo de reacción a las 
alarmas de sistema. Este experimento fue ejecutado para investigar si hay diferencias en respuestas diferenciales a alarmas visuales 
comparándolas a alarmas auditivas. Los resultados indican que las alarmas visuales son percibidas de manera más eficiente que las alarmas 
auditivas. Incluso, se pudo ver una correlación negativa entre la cantidad de errores y el tiempo de reacción, lo que indica una diferencia 
individual en su disposición a errores cuando reaccionan a alarmas visuales en operaciones de supervisión.   
 




1.  Introduction 
 
Technological progress has contributed to more advanced 
human-machine systems. However, in complex systems, 
human error is still perceived as a cause or contributing factor 
to in approximately 90% of accidents. Most of these 
accidents could have been prevented by safety management 
measures [1]. This is particularly visible in the case of 
accidents in construction and manufacturing, in which errors 
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are viewed as inappropriate human decisions that have a 
negative impact on the operation of technical systems. 
Thereby they impact system performance by reducing safety 
and effectiveness [2]. Management of human errors is 
commonly focused on training, motivation, hardware design, 
and management systems, all of which can lead to improved 
safety performance [3,4]. 
In this paper, the role of humans in system failures in an 
industrial setting is discussed, and the particular element of 
alarm perception and reaction is tested in an experiment. The 
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study aims to illustrate the effect of different alarm signals on 
human operators’ reaction times and identify alarms for 
which the response was defined according to a pre-defined 
code. Reaction time and the correctness of responses for 
compound reactions were assessed for auditory and visual 
signals in a laboratory simulation situation. The final part of 
the paper formulates recommendations for overall system 
performance in machinery and equipment design. 
 
2.  Human contribution to occupational accidents  
 
Theories on the causes of occupational accidents have 
changed over the years. However, two basic perspectives on 
human error and human contribution to accidents can be 
identified [5,6]. The first approach, hereafter named the “old” 
approach began at the start of the 20th century. This approach 
states that “…certain individuals are always more likely than 
others to sustain accidents, even though exposed to equal risk…” 
[7, p.1]. The basic assumption in the ‘old’ approach was to see 
engineered systems as fundamentally safe, while unreliable 
humans were the primary threats to safety. According to this 
approach, the employer was not responsible for bad working 
conditions, and employees were accused of causing accidents 
[8]. The way to improve safety was to protect the systems 
through the training of operators, by keeping discipline, and 
through the application of procedures and through the selection 
of appropriate workers (e.g. by employing the less accident 
prone workers). In more recent times, this approach involved 
introducing automation in industrial processes [5]. It was not 
until the second half of the twentieth century that a system was 
seen as a factor that contributed to accidents. Employers were 
also required to provide safe working conditions for the first 
time. At the same time, it was realised that a person's accident 
proneness may differ from one period to another [7,9]. 
Moreover, research has shown that dismissing workers due to 
their accident proneness does not positively affect the ratio of 
occupational accidents [10]. The problem of accident proneness 
remains a widely discussed topic [11] and studies show that 
operators’ accident proneness only refers to a small amount of 
accidents, for which the application of preventive safety barriers 
can reduce the involved risks [12].  
Alternatively, according to the new approach, human 
error is no longer seen as a cause, but rather as a symptom of 
an underlying systemic weakness or failure. Hence, human 
error is not a cause in itself but it rather is something that must 
be explained. In contrast to the assumptions of the old 
approach, the new approach holds that safety is not intrinsic 
in systems as systems are created to fulfil multiple 
incompatible human goals simultaneously. Many of these 
goals can be conflicting, as is exemplified by the wish to 
improve safety and efficiency simultaneously (e.g. reducing 
relative number of errors while also increasing production). 
Human error is clearly associated with features of tools, tasks 
and operating environments. Therefore, human beings and 
their interaction with technology are important for creating 
safety and progress in terms of safety levels [5]. Thus, there 
is need for further investigation of human error and 
organizational deficiencies, design problems, and procedural 
shortcomings. Following on from this, it can be claimed that 
Table 1.  
Accident models: a review. 





Ancestry and social environment, 
worker fault, unsafe act together with 
mechanical and physical hazard, 
accident, damage or injury  
 
Lack of control: inadequate program, 
program standard, compliance to 
standard; basic causes: personal 
factors, job factors; immediate causes: 
substandard acts, substandard 
conditions; incident: contact with 
energy or substance; loss: people, 
property, environment, progress  
 
Fallible board decisions and policy, 
line management problems, 
psychological precursors of unsafe 
acts, unsafe acts, accident  
 
Government, regulators associations, 
company, management, staff, work  
 
 
Inadequate control or enforcement of 
safety-related constraints, safety: 
control problem; accidents appear 
when component failures, external 
disturbances, dysfunctional 
interactions between system 

















































Source: Adapted from [13-17]. 
 
 
the new approach to human error shows a significant 
movement towards human factors and points to new ways of 
managing organizational safety. 
As there are different approaches to the causes of 
occupational accidents, the literature review allowed us to 
make a distinction between different accident theories, as are 
summarised Table 1. 
These models provide an insight into how and why 
accidents happen in organization. However, it should be 
stressed that there are only a few accident models that are 
based on human factors research [11]. They refer to different 
factors that appear in many forms; however, generally they 
reflect human and technical aspects, when a human being can 
be recognized as assurance of safety. It should also be 
mentioned that the technical system design can be 
controlled/designed to reduce the occurrence of human 
errors, whereas the control of environmental factors and 
manner of human operation of the system are somewhat less 
controllable. Predominantly, in large organizations and 
compound technologies, more than one sin gle liability can 
be distinguished [5,8,15,18].  
 
3.  Process safety performance 
 
Over the last three decades, automation has changed the 
role of operators from manual control to supervision [10]. A 
great effort has been put into equipment design and interface, 
operation, operator selection and training and behavioral 
enforcement. These efforts have resulted in a drop of process 
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safety accidents. There is still a need to operate complex 
systems with the recognition of operation breakdowns that 
occur as a result of human error [18]. It should be emphasized 
that the main category of human error is operating errors. For 
example, the following situations can result in operating 
errors [19]: 
 lack of appropriate procedures 
 task complexity and overload conditions 
 poor personnel selection and training 
 operator carelessness and lack of interest 
 poor environmental conditions 
 departure from the correct operating procedures 
In order to monitor the performance of systems the 
operators have to do many tasks that can rely on [20]: 
 monitoring sensor data from components (voltages, status 
of the capacitors, transmission lines, transformers, circuit 
breakers, etc.) 
 monitoring the grid as a holistic system  
 communicating information among several sub-systems 
 responding to alarms 
Alarm systems play a significant role in industrial 
production as they assure process quality and reliability. 
Industrial production requires human operators who observe, 
and, if necessary, intervene in process malfunction or 
abnormal system performance i.e. when the values of the 
system parameters exceed predefined tolerance limits, or 
approach critical levels [21,22]. However, nowadays a large 
number of notifications, which are configured inside such a 
system, lead to the operator receiving much more alerts than 
s/he can physically and cognitively perceive. Due to the 
material, energy and information flow in a plant, particular 
disturbances can cause multiple subsequent alarm messages, 
which may overload the operator with redundant alarms. This 
results in an “alarm flood”, when an operator is not able to 
react within a recommended response time and find the root 
cause of disturbances. Finally, the industrial applications of 
alarm systems become unreliable due to their complexity 
[23].  
In order to increase knowledge of human reactions to 
unreliable signals, researchers refer to theories of learning 
and human cognition such as:  
 Probability matching - the approximation of the perceived 
true alarm rate on the basis of the observed alarm 
responses  
 Signal Detection Theory - signal detection and response 
is more rapid for historically reliable alarm systems 
 Automation trust - the exhibited trust relates to behavioral 
patterns of system use and misuse  
Regardless of what the operation task is, alarm reaction 
patters are unquestionably influenced by perceived alarm 
system reliability [24].  
According to Lee and See [25] reliability of the alarm 
system is described as the percentage of critical events that 
are correctly identified by the alarm system. It is determined 
by the alarm’s sensitivity, setting of thresholds and defined 
probability of dangerous conditions [26]. The higher the 
alarm system's reliability is, the more that operators can rely 
on the alarm and the less monitoring the data is required. On 
the other hand, when reliability is low, the chance of the 
occurrence of false alarms or misses is higher and the relevant 
process data have to be monitored more frequently to be able 
to keep monitoring performance at a high level [27,28]. 
Unreliable systems can contribute to sensor failure or their 
inadequate performances, data processing limitations or 
output failure (i.e. electrical problems or component 
malfunction, etc.). All these states can lead to potentially 
hazardous situations as they cause more deviations in other 
parts of the plant [23].   
 
4.  Human reaction to alarms 
 
Displays and controls have been used for a long time in 
human-machine interfaces. They range from simple to 
complex manufacturing systems and processes. There are 
also distinct sets of human factor principles for choosing 
frequency, duration, and intensity of signal presentation. In 
order to obtain attention and a response, the two most 
common modalities can be differentiated, which are visual 
and auditory signals.  
In everyday life, most information is perceived with the 
eyes; however, in complex systems, where the object of the 
task is out of visual view, the use of auditory stimuli has 
become more common. Therefore, in industrial control visual 
and auditory signals are often presented together rather than 
as alternatives; however, they may also be separate or 
simultaneous, synchronous or asynchronous [29,30]. They 
can be used in hand and/or foot controlled communication 
devices. The foot controls are mainly designed for seated 
operators when there is a need to reduce the workload on the 
hands, or when free hands are required for tasks with greater 
levels of precision and skill. However, it should be 
emphasized that even in the case of equipment or systems 
that have foot controls (i.e. automobiles, airplanes), nearly all 
controls are assigned for hand control [31]. 
The literature studies revealed that the timing of auditory 
stimuli is generally longer than the timing of visual stimuli 
for the same signals presented separately. Furthermore, 
duration discrimination is more precise for auditory than for 
visual stimuli in simultaneous presentations [32]. It was also 
identified that the time perception relies on the prefrontal and 
parietal regions, and on the auditory and visual cortices. 
However, the neural mechanism responsible for these 
modalities remains unclear [33]. Moreover, in recognition of 
visual and auditory signals, the phenomenon called visual 
dominance [34] must be taken into account. Based on this, 
auditory signals may seem not to be responded to in 
simultaneous presentation with visual signals, which 
indicates that their use can be ineffective in control situations. 
Nevertheless, in many situations, it was recognized that they 
might stimulate situational awareness and thereby improve 
the effectiveness of visual displays. They are superior to 
visual signals for warning in monitoring tasks in which there 
is no need to observe a particular location all the time [35]. 
The level of urgency of alarms is correlated with the level 
of urgency of the indicated danger [36]. Furthermore, the 
perception of alarms is subject to their frequency, intensity, 
and repetition. For instance, a low frequency alarm, which is 
repeated slowly, shows low urgency, whereas a high 
frequency alarm repeated quickly implies high urgency [37]. 
In simulated conditions it was shown that the reduction of 
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luminous intensity from 42 to 5 cd increases the reaction time 
by 84 ms [38]. In the case of auditory signals, increased 
signal intensity causes faster reaction time, whereas its high-
intensity, which is synchronous with a visual signal, reduces 
choice reaction time [39]. Thus, the growth of the intensity 
of auditory signal weakens the visual supremacy. For 
synchronous auditory and visual tasks, sound source location 
does not have a facilitating effect. It was concluded that 
sound not only warns, but also has an overall alerting effect. 
Auditory signals are quite useful when the spatial-visual 
information is limited or chaotic. For instance, they can be 
applied in control console tasks in which they alert operators 
or request action. While listening to critical auditory 
messages, visual signals are monitored. To optimize their 
reaction rate and reduce their performance lag, a fore-period 
warning (at least 2s and no more than 4s) is required to draw 
attention to incoming signals. Both signals should be 
simultaneously presented from the same direction to ensure 
quick responses. Nevertheless, in the case of asynchronous 
signals, a short delay (200 ms) between them may give a 
negative result, giving a poor response speed and accuracy 
[29]. 
Base on the literature study, it was hypothesized that 
reaction times for visual alarms would be significantly 
shorter than reaction times for audible alarms. It was also 
postulated that audible alarms would have a higher 
percentage of errors than visual alarms.  
 
5.  Materials and methods 
 
Eighty-seven second-year students from engineering 
management and safety engineering courses in Poznan 
University of Technology participated in the experiment. The 
sample consisted of 36 males and 51 females, with a mean 
age of 20.16 years (SD = 0.37). They did not report having 
hearing loss or color vision deficiency. In order to have free 
movements they were asked to wear casual and comfortable 
clothing. As the experiment was conducted during their 
laboratory classes, all the students were awarded a course 
credit. 
At the beginning of the experiment the task was clearly 
explained, and then participants were allowed to practice 
until they became familiarized with it. Their individual 
training lasted for about 5 minutes. Afterwards, they 
experienced 3 visual and 1 auditory signals while operating 
the simulator (MCR-2001E). The experimental task was to 
react to 50 signals according to the previously defined code, 
which is shown in Table 2. When the experimental task  
 
Table 2.  
Alarm sequence representation 





































Source: The authors. 
started, a single auditory or visual target signal appeared on 
its own for each test trial. No feedback on the accuracy of 
responses was given to the participants. 
Only reaction times for correct responses were recorded. 
Incorrect responses were given a reaction time of zero (0) and 
treated as a missing variable in the statistical analysis. Mean 
reaction time was calculated by summing up all the correct 
response times for each participant and then dividing this sum 
by the number of correct responses for visual and auditory 
alarms respectively. 
IBM SPSS 22 was used for statistical analysis. All 
confidence intervals for r (Pearson correlation) were 
calculated using the bootstrap function in SPSS, and there 
were 1000 resamplings that had replacement.  
 
6.  Results and discussion 
 
Visual alarms (M = 524.67 ms, 99% CI [506.39, 540.73]) 
had a significantly shorter reaction time than audible alarms 
(M = 579.27 ms, 99% CI [552.88, 608.64]) as measured by a 
paired samples t-test (t(86) = -6.336, Mdiff = -54.61 ms, 99% 
CI of Mdiff [-77.31, -31.90], p < .001). This is in accordance 
with the literature review and the stated expectations of this 
study. 
Following this difference in mean reaction time, a 
difference in delayed (but correct) responses was expected. 
Delayed responses where defined as responses with more 
than 500 ms reaction time. Visual alarms had a much lower 
ratio of delayed responses (M = 42.78%, 99% CI [37.37%, 
49.47%]) than audible alarms (M = 57.12%, 99% CI 
[49.01%, 65.57%]). This difference was statistically 
significant as measured by a paired samples t-test (t(86) = -
4.869, Mdiff = -14.33%, 99% CI of Mdiff [-22.09%, -6.58%], p 
< .001).  
Regarding the number of errors, a paired samples t-test 
showed that there was no difference in the ratio of errors for 
visual alarms (M = 11.30%, 99% CI [9.35%, 13.49%]) as 
compared to audible alarms (M = 10.49%, 99% CI [7.61%, 
13.36%]). The difference was not significant (t(86) = 0.616, 
Mdiff = -0.008%, 99% CI of Mdiff [-0.027, 0.043], p = .54). 
This is not in accordance with the hypothesized difference 
that audible alarms would be more prone to errors. 
When the relationship between the rate of errors and 
reaction time was further investigated, a statistically 
significant negative correlation was found between reaction 
time for visual alarms and the ratio of errors to correct 
responses (r(87)= -.301, 95% CI [-.484, -.085]). This indicated 
that the participants who on average responded faster to 
visual alarms also tended to make a larger number of errors; 
therefore, this indicated an individual difference in error-
proneness when reacting to visual alarms in a supervisory 
task.  
For audible alarms, the same negative correlation 
between reaction times and ratio of errors was observed, but 
this relationship was not statistically significant (r(87)=-0.95, 
95% CI [-.223, .117]). The lack of a significant negative 
correlation in this study could be due to the relatively lower 
number of auditory alarms (8 in total) compared to visual 
alarms (42 in total).  
This study employed a non-randomized convenience 
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sample, hence limiting the ability to make causal inferences 
outside the current sample. However, our findings are still in 
accordance with the existing literature on this matter.  
The limited number of audible alarms has restricted our 
ability to identify real differences in error rates when 
responding to audible alarms. This limitation can explain our 
lack of ability to statistically identify differences between 
error rates as well as the lack of a significant negative 
correlation between reaction time and error rates for audible 
alarms. This limitation can be amended in future studies by 
balancing the number of visual to audible alarms.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
In any process industry, safety issues are of primary 
importance as any accident can have cataclysmic 
consequences for both people and the environment. 
Therefore, efforts must be made to prevent or limit the 
hazards of the plant. To achieve this aim, an increasing 
number of industrial quality and reliability systems is 
applied. In these systems, operators pay attention to present 
process states and predict their future states using 
information from alarm systems. Alarms are frequently 
performed via display terminals in which information is 
presented in a variety of formats. In this paper, particular 
attention has been paid to visual and audible signals. The 
results of the present study revealed that the participants 
could react faster to visual signals than audible ones when the 
signals are predefined according to a code. No difference was 
found in the reaction of errors compared with the total 
number of alarms.  
These results aim to be helpful in formulating 
recommendations to work towards a more optimal design of 
control consoles when auditory and visual displays are 
presented. They may be also effective in improving system 
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